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ABSTRACT 
 
We provide the effects of voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost on analysts’ earnings forecasts. We set 
up and analyze the disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost as a proxy for voluntary disclosure. Specifically, 
we examine the associations between voluntary disclosure of it and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts and bias in 
earnings forecasts. The results of our study are as follows. First, the relationship between voluntary disclosure of the schedule 
of manufacturing cost and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is significant in the positive (+) direction. This means 
that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is higher in the case of the firms that voluntarily disclosed the schedule of 
manufacturing cost, as compared to other firms. Second, the relationship between voluntary disclosure of the schedule of 
manufacturing cost and analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts is significant in the negative (-) direction. This means that analysts 
underestimate earnings in the case of the firms that voluntarily disclose the schedule of manufacturing cost, as compared to 
other firms. Since the schedule of manufacturing cost is still an interesting item and useful information in the capital market, 
the results of our study provide important implications not only to managers, but also to investors and supervisory authority. 
Limitations of our study include the fact that not all diverse variables that affect voluntary disclosure and analysts’ forecasts 
are considered.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study examines the effects of voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost on analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Specifically, a firm that disclose all five items (raw materials, labor costs, 
manufacturing overheads, total manufacturing cost for the year, manufacturing cost during the year) 
among items of the schedule of manufacturing cost is defined as a firm (VDUM) that voluntarily disclosed it. Next, 
we examine the associations between voluntary disclosure of it and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
bias in earnings forecasts. 
 
Voluntary disclosure is a system that enables public firms to disclose major management information regarding the 
relevant firms, with the exception of important management matters, through a voluntary judgment by the relevant 
firms by expanding the items for voluntary disclosure that have been limited to only some items with a view to 
enhancing the disclosure ability of public firms1. Voluntary disclosure is one of various forms of non-scheduled 
disclosure among the types of disclosure in the circulation market and plays the role of providing firm information 
when the securities supplied to the market are traded among investors. 
 
Firms will voluntarily disclose information on them to solve the problem of information asymmetry between capital 
providers and managers and the agency problem resulting from the separation of ownership and control. By contrast, 
                                                
1 Korea Exchange (http://www.krx.co.kr/) 
T 
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managers may have incentives to provide information arbitrarily, because voluntary disclosure is neither compulsory, 
nor verified by a third party. In such situations, voluntary disclosure may rather aggravate information asymmetry, 
because managers may have incentives to hide unfavorable information and selectively provide only favorable 
information (Sohn et al., 2008; Oh and Shin, 2016). 
 
Previous studies regarding voluntary disclosure have focused on information asymmetry reduction and its effects on 
the capital market (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 1999). The results of previous studies demonstrate 
that voluntary disclosure generally contributes to reductions in information asymmetry, leading to positive responses 
in the capital market. However, not all effects of voluntary disclosure are positive. Some studies indicate positive 
functions of voluntary disclosure, such as reductions in capital costs (Lee and Shin, 2010; Na and Leem, 2014), while 
other results report that voluntary disclosure rather increases information asymmetry, as errors in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are larger in firms that actively implement voluntary disclosure (Sohn et al., 2008; Oh and Shin, 2016). 
 
One of major causes of the controversies in the results of previous studies is difficulties in the quantification of 
disclosure information, which is qualitative, into objective measures. That is, the validity of study results regarding 
disclosure relies on the objectivity of the measures of disclosure quality. Accordingly, domestic disclosure- related 
studies used diverse proxies to measure disclosure quality. Such proxies include management forecasts, autonomous 
disclosure information, and the evaluation scores regarding disclosure of the Korea Corporate Governance Service 
used for fair disclosure. In this study, we use whether or not to disclose of the schedule of manufacturing cost as a 
proxy of disclosure quality2. Due to the amendment of financial reporting standard no. 21, the schedule of 
manufacturing cost have been changed from an item for mandatory disclosure to an item for voluntary disclosure. The 
change in the disclosure environment from mandatory disclosure that must observe the disclosure regulations of 
regulatory authorities to voluntary disclosure will have large effects on the information environment in the capital 
market. To examine the information usefulness of voluntary disclosure, we analyze the effects of voluntary disclosure 
of the schedule of manufacturing cost on analysts’ earnings forecasts for the period from 2004 to 2014. 
 
 Analysts play the role of reducing information asymmetry between firms and investors by accurately analyzing 
information provided by firms and providing the processed information to the capital market. They have more 
expertise on accounting information and play the role of information brokers who produce and deliver information on 
firms’ intrinsic values (Shipper, 1989). In other words, if they accurately figure out the quality of earnings and provide 
this information to the capital market, information risks can be removed (Oh, 2016). Our results provide useful 
implications for the capital market by showing how voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost 
interpret and transmit information by financial analysts.  
 
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we use whether or not to disclose the schedule of 
manufacturing cost as a proxy of voluntary disclosure. The disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost, which 
has been changed from an item for mandatory disclosure to an item for voluntary disclosure by the amendment of the 
financial reporting standards, provides appropriate study environment for the analysis of the effects of voluntary 
disclosure on the capital market.  
 
Second, the significance of our study lies in that it empirically analyzes the effects of the disclosure of the schedule 
of manufacturing cost on changes of information asymmetry in the capital market by examining the association 
between voluntary disclosure the schedule of manufacturing cost and analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the research design. Section 4 presents the empirical results of the study. Finally, 
section 5 concludes the study. 
  
                                                
2 On December 24, 2004, the Financial Services Commission announced that the amended financial reporting standard should be applied to business 
reports for 2004 and thereafter. The schedule of manufacturing cost had been an item for compulsory disclosure and was changed into an item for 
voluntary disclosure for business reports for 2004 and thereafter. Therefore, voluntary disclosure the schedule of manufacturing cost is meaningful 
as a proxy of voluntary disclosure. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2017 Volume 33, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 625 The Clute Institute 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Voluntary disclosure of financial information generates changes in the information asymmetry between firms and 
shareholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The possibility of involvement of firms’ discretion in compulsory disclosure 
is low, because severe sanctions will be imposed by regulatory authorities against violations of the regulations related 
to compulsory disclosure. However, voluntary disclosure can be regarded as a manifestation of active will of firms to 
reduce information asymmetry between them and external users (Na and Leem, 2014) 3. Therefore, previous studies 
regarding voluntary disclosure have focused on the determinants of voluntary disclosure, whether or not voluntary 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry, and the effects of the decrease of information asymmetry on the capital 
market. We examine the association between analysts who play an important role in reducing the information 
asymmetry in the capital market and voluntary disclosure.   
 
Major motives of public firms’ disclosure include the decrease in information asymmetry and capital cost saving 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Verrecchia, 1999). Increases in the levels of disclosure lead to decrease in 
information asymmetry and capital costs (Botosan, 1997; Francis et al., 2008). Based on the nature of disclosure, Lee 
and Shin (2010) classified cases of disclosure into favorable disclosure cases and unfavorable disclosure cases and 
analyzed the effects of the nature of disclosure on capital costs. They found that voluntary disclosure reduce capital 
costs and firms are making efforts to reduce information asymmetry between them and information users by actively 
disclosing not only favorable, but also unfavorable information. 
 
Heflinet et al. (2003) analyzed the effects of the introduction of the fair disclosure system on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. They reported that the accuracy and variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts do not change after the 
introduction of the fair disclosure system. This indicates that the introduction of the fair disclosure system at least does 
not cause damage to information environment. In addition, Shane et al. (2001) reported that the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts is not reduced after the introduction of the fair disclosure system, although there is the uncertainty 
of information collection due to the prohibition of provision of selective information to users.  
 
Meanwhile, some of the results of previous studies indicate that voluntary disclosure rather aggravates information 
asymmetry. Agrawal et al. (2006) reported that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts decreases and the variance 
increases after the introduction of the fair disclosure system. Irani and Karamanou (2002) reported that the variance 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts increase and the number of analysts decrease after the introduction of the fair disclosure 
system. The cause of this tendency relates to the fact that analysts have difficulties in collecting professional 
information due to the introduction of the fair disclosure system. 
 
Sohn et al. (2008) examined the associations between voluntary disclosure and the variance of and errors in analysts’ 
forecasts. According to the results of this analysis, when the level of voluntary disclosure is higher, the variance of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts is smaller and errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts are larger. These results are interpreted 
that when firm’s discretion is involved in voluntary disclosure to a high degree, analysts’ forecasts are biased in a 
certain direction, leading to the increase of information asymmetry between firms and investors. 
 
In the amended financial reporting standard No.21, the disclosure of the details of composition of the costs of goods 
manufactured is as follows. There are arguments that the details of composition of the costs of goods manufactured 
should be disclosed because they are useful for accounting information users to figure out firms’ management 
performance to predict firms’ future cash flows. While, there are other arguments that the details of composition of 
the costs of goods manufactured should not be disclosed because they fall under firms’ trade secrets. The standards 
accepted the latter logic and did not include the details of composition of the costs of goods manufactured such as raw 
materials, labor costs, and manufacturing overheads in the mandatory disclosure items4. That is, the amended financial 
reporting standards accepted the latter (based on the proprietary cost theory), rather than the former (based of the 
                                                
3 Compulsory disclosure refers to the disclosure forced by the law that stipulate items that must be disclosed and the form of disclosure such as 
periodic disclosure and mandatory non-scheduled disclosure. Voluntary disclosure refers to the free disclosure made by firms pursuant to the 
managers’ arbitrary judgment through press media such as economic newspapers, investment relations (IR), and electronic disclosure systems (Kim 
et al., 2016). 
4 Korea Accounting Standards board of Korea Accounting Institute 2006. 2. 6. 
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perspective of valuation). Accordingly, the schedule of manufacturing cost is not a mandatory disclosure item any 
further, but is a voluntary disclosure item. 
 
Although it was not mandatory disclosure, Kim et al. (2016) identified that there are firms that voluntarily disclose 
the schedule of manufacturing cost and analyzed what incentives such firms make to voluntarily disclose of the 
schedule of manufacturing cost. They found that firms with lower ages and higher debt ratios, sales cost ratios, and 
management performance more frequently make voluntary disclosures of manufacturing cost information. By 
contrast, the firms with higher productivity and industrial competitiveness, less frequently make voluntary disclosures 
of manufacturing cost information, thereby supporting the proprietary cost theory. In addition, they found that firms 
with cost stickiness or firms audited by Big 4 audit firms do not disclose manufacturing cost information. 
 
Bae et al. (2013) empirically analyzed whether voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost reduces the 
costs of borrowed capitals. The analysis period was from 2006 to 2010 and the analyzed firms were KOSPI and 
KOSDAQ firms listed on the Korea Exchange. They concluded that the firms that voluntarily disclose the schedule 
of manufacturing cost are low the costs of borrowed capital, as compared to the firms that do not voluntarily it. These 
results suggest that the voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost removes information asymmetry 
between firms and capital investors and reduces capital costs. 
 
To summarize the results of previous studies, disclosure information voluntarily provided by firm solves the problem 
of information asymmetry between firms and investors in general, but there is also a possibility of increasing 
information asymmetry when the manager provides arbitrary information. If a manager voluntarily provides 
information as an effort to reduce information asymmetry and if reliable information is provided to analysts, the 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts will be increased. In such cases, the analysts provide useful information to 
the capital market through earnings forecasting, thereby reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
investors (Han and Shin, 2015). By contrast, providing information biased in favor of his/her firm to pursue personal 
gains from an opportunistic viewpoint will lead to opposite results. That is, when the quality of information provided 
by a firm is lower and the uncertainty is higher, the reliability of the earnings forecast information provided by analysts 
cannot but be lower (Song, 2008). Therefore, the effects of voluntary disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecasts may 
be both positive (+) and negative (-). Since voluntary disclosure is positively or negatively correlated with analysts’ 
earnings forecasts depending on cases as such, the effects of voluntary disclosure on analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
an empirical problem. Based on these conflicting views, we propose the following null hypotheses: 
 
H1: Voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost does not affect analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
H1a: Voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost does not affect the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  
 
H1b: Voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufactured does not affect the biases (overestimation or 
underestimation) in analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Empirical Models 
 
We use the following multivariate model to test the effect of voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing 
cost on analysts’ earnings forecasts. Specifically, analysts’ earnings forecasts are separately analyzed for the 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts (AFACC) and bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts (AFBIAS). 
 𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐶$% = 		𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀$% + 𝛽0𝐸𝑄$% + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆$% + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽:𝑅𝑂𝐸$% + 𝛽<𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% +𝛽?𝐴𝐺𝐸$% + 𝛽A𝐺𝑅𝑊$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀% (1) 
 𝐴𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆$% = 	 	𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀$% + 𝛽0𝐸𝑄$% + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆$% + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽:𝑅𝑂𝐸$% + 𝛽<𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% +𝛽?𝐴𝐺𝐸$% + 𝛽A𝐺𝑅𝑊$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀%		 (2) 
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Consistent with prior studies, we measure accuracy as the unsigned forecast error defined as the absolute value of 
forecast error: AFACCit = | AFit - AEit | / Pit, where AFit is analysts’ forecast for firm i for the fiscal year t and AEit is 
the actual realized earnings per share for firm i in year t and Pit is market value per share for firm i in year t. To ease 
exposition, we multiply the accuracy variable by -1 so that a higher value suggests a more accurately forecasts. The 
bias as the signed forecast error defined as AFBIASit = (AFit - AEit) / Pit, where AFit is analysts’ forecast for firm i for 
the fiscal year t and AEit is the actual realized earnings per share for firm i in year t. If forecast error is positive (+), 
the earnings forecasts are overestimated, and if it is negative (-), the earnings forecasts are underestimated. VDUMit 
is a voluntary disclosure dummy, which is 1 for the firms that made voluntary disclosure and 0 otherwise. As a variable 
of interest of Hypotheses1a and 1b, the sign of β1 does not predict the direction according to previous studies. If the 
voluntary disclosure has positive functions, the value of the accuracy of earnings forecasts should have positive (+) 
direction, and if the voluntary disclosure has negative functions, direction should be negative (-). The value of bias in 
earnings forecasts should have negative (-) direction in the case of underestimation and positive (+) direction in the 
case of overestimation.  
 
Based on the results of previous studies, earnings quality (EQ), the number of analysts (FOLLOWS), and the number 
of years from the date of initial listing to the end of the previous period (AGE) are included as control variables. For 
earnings quality (EQ), we use the most popular method in the literature based on the modified Jones Model (1995). 
We also include financial leverage (LEV), return on equity (ROE), firm size (SIZE), asset growth (GRW). Finally, 
we include industry (IND) and year (YD) fixed effect. Appendix describes how all of these variables are constructed.  
 
3.2 Measurement of Variables 
 
3.2.1 Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
 
A significant body of research on analysts’ earnings forecasts has investigated their accuracy and bias (Brown, 1993; 
Das et al., 1997). Consistent with prior studies, we measure accuracy as the unsigned forecast error defined as the 
absolute value of forecast error: AFACCit = | AFit - AEit | / Pit where, AFit is analysts’ forecast for firm i for the fiscal 
year t, AEit is the actual realized earnings per share for firm i in year t, and Pit is market value per share for firm i in 
year t. To ease exposition, we multiply the accuracy variable by -1 so that a higher value suggests a more accurately 
forecasts. The bias as the signed forecast error defined as AFBIASit = (AFit - AEit) / Pit, where AFit is analysts’ forecast 
for firm i for the fiscal year t and AEit is the actual realized earnings per share for firm i in year t. If forecast error is 
positive (+), the earnings forecasts are overestimated, and if it is negative (-), the earnings forecasts are underestimated. 
 
3.2.2 The Voluntary Disclosure of The Schedule of Manufacturing Cost 
 
In this study, whether or not a firm make voluntary disclosure is measured as follows. The five items (raw materials, 
labor costs, manufacturing overheads, total manufacturing cost for the year, costs of goods manufactured during the 
year) that are considered to be the most important cost items among the items of the schedule of manufacturing cost 
are selected. Then, if each of the items are disclosed, it becomes a dummy variable having a value of 1, and a value 
of 0 otherwise. Thereafter, firms are regarded to have voluntarily disclosed the schedule of manufacturing cost when 
the sum of the five dummy variables was 5 (when all five items are disclosed). Thus, if five manufacturing cost items 
are disclosed, it becomes a dummy variable (VDUM) having a value of 1, and a value of 0 otherwise (Kim et al., 
2016). 
 
3.2.3 The Quality of Earnings 
 
There is no universally accepted measure of the quality of earnings. We employ a modified version of the Jones Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995) that have been used in prior research. The modification is designed to eliminate the conjectured 
tendency of Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretion is exercised over revenues. 
Specifically, we estimate the following model by year and for each industry that has at least 10 observations: 
 𝑇𝐴𝐶$% = 𝛼) 1/𝐴$%I+ + 𝛼+ ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉$% − ∆𝐴𝑅$% + 𝛼0𝑃𝑃𝐸$% + 𝜀$% (3) 
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where, TACit is total accruals, measured as the change in non-cash current assets minus the change in current non-
interest-bearing liabilities, minus depreciation and amortization expense for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total 
assets (Ait-1); △REVit is the annual change in revenues scaled by lagged total assets; △ARit is the annual change in 
accounts receivable; PPEit is property, plant, and equipment for firm i at year t, scaled by lagged total assets. The 
residuals from the regression model are discretionary accruals. In this study, we use the absolute values of 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for the quality of earnings. We multiply the absolute values of discretionary accruals 
by -1(EQ). Thus, higher values of EQ represent higher the quality of earnings. 
 
3.3 Sample Selection 
 
In this study, our sample consist of firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) during the period 
2004-2014. We obtain financial data from FN Data-Guide and KIS-VALUE database, which provides the financial 
statements of all listed firms. For comparability, we exclude firms with non-December fiscal year-ends and all firms 
in which total liabilities are larger than the total assets. Table 1 shows the sample selection criteria and the number of 
excluded firms to arrive at our final sample. This screening procedure yielded a total of 1,998 firm-year observations. 
The financial data of the samples for analysis are winsorized at extreme value 1% before being used5. 
 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria N 
Firm-year observations listed on the KOSPI as of the end of December during the period 2002-2011 7,632 
(Less) Firm-year observations for which financial data are not available (435) 
(Less) Firm-year observations without the analysts’ forecast information  (4,512) 
(Less) Firm-year observations with non-December fiscal year-ends and banking (687) 
Total number of firm-year observations in the final sample 1,998 
 
 
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of major variables. The mean (median) of the accuracy of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (AFACC) is -0.072 (–0.028), and the mean (median) of analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts (AFBIAS) is 
0.047 (0.014). The firms that make voluntary disclosure (VDUM) show the mean of 0.316, indicating that is about 
30% of the samples voluntarily disclosed the schedule of manufacturing cost. The quality of earnings (EQ) show the 
mean of –0.054 and the number of analysts (FOLLOWS) show the mean of 6.33. Financial leverage (LEV) show the 
mean of 0.491 and the median of 0.506 and return on equity (ROE) show the mean of 2.96% and the median of 8.64%. 
The mean (median) of Firm sizes (SIZE) is 27.731 (27.473). The number of years after listing (AGE) show the mean 
of 18.37 and the median of 17 and asset growth (GRW) show the mean of 26.7% and the median of 9.9%. Since 
financial leverage (LEV) and firm sizes (SIZE) show the means that are very close to their medians, their distributions 
can be assumed to be close to normal distribution. Return on equity (ROE) and asset growth (GRW) can be seen that 
the distribution is uneven, because large differences between their means and medians are observed. 
 
  
                                                
5 The results of analysis after removing extreme value 1% of the data showed similar values to those of the winsorized empirical results. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
AFACC -0.072 0.147 -1.384 -0.073 -0.028 -0.010 0.000 
AFBIAS 0.047 0.154 -0.260 -0.006 0.014 0.057 1.384 
VDUM 0.316 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
EQ -0.054 0.056 -0.305 -0.071 -0.037 -0.016 0.000 
FOLLOWS 6.326 6.247 0.000 1.000 4.000 10.000 30.000 
LEV 0.491 0.187 0.118 0.340 0.506 0.633 0.903 
ROE 2.958 21.770 -46.960 1.660 8.640 15.080 44.520 
SIZE 27.731 1.567 24.852 26.558 24.473 28.784 31.873 
AGE 18.367 12.448 0.000 7.000 17.000 29.000 57.000 
GRW 0.267 1.380 -0.982 0.007 0.099 0.225 15.386 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the sample (1,998 firm-year observations) including the listed firms on 
the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) over the period 2004 to 2014. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of Pearson correlations of major variables. The accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(AFACC) are significantly positively correlated with earnings quality (EQ), the number of analysts (FOLLOWS), and 
return on equity (ROE). This means that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate for the firms with better 
earnings quality, larger numbers of analysts, and larger return on equity. By contrast, AFACC is significantly 
negatively correlated with the voluntary disclosure dummy (VDUM), financial leverage (LEV), and the number of 
years after listing (AGE). This means that analysts’ earnings forecasts are less accurate for the firms that make 
voluntary disclosure, have higher debt ratios, and have larger numbers of years after listing.  
 
Analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts (AFBIAS) are significantly negatively correlated with earnings quality (EQ), the 
number of analysts (FOLLOWS), and return on equity (ROE). This means that actual earnings per share are larger 
than analysts’ earnings forecasts, that is, analysts underestimate earnings per share in the case of the firms with better 
earnings quality, larger numbers of analysts, and larger returns on equity. As correlation results do not control for 
differences in firm, industry characteristics, we now turn to multivariate tests.  
 
 
Table 3. Correlations among the Variables 
 AFBIAS VDUM EQ FOLLOWS LEV ROE t SIZE AGE GRW 
AFACC -0.864 -0.039 0.081 0.117 -0.238 0.243 0.007 -0.065 0.009 
AFBIAS  0.028 -0.066 -0.095 0.207 -0.279 -0.023 0.031 -0.015 
VDUM   0.022 -0.142 0.136 0.083 -0.134 0.025 -0.039 
EQ    0.070 -0.027 -0.069 0.145 0.115 0.020 
FOLLOWS     0.054 0.011 0.536 0.020 0.004 
LEV      -0.078 0.428 0.130 0.060 
ROE       -0.051 -0.100 -0.023 
SIZE        0.259 0.090 
AGE         -0.107 
Note: This table reports Pearson correlations for variables. Coefficients shown in bold are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). See the Appendix 
for all variable definitions. 
 
 
4.2 Multivariate Results 
 
4.2.1 Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure and the Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
 
Table 4 shows the results of regression analysis of Equation (1) for the effects of voluntary disclosure on the accuracy 
of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The F value in the analysis results is statistically significant, which indicates that the 
research model is appropriate6. In Table 4, the regression coefficient (β1) of VDUM that shows the effect of voluntary 
disclosure on the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast have significant positive (+) values, although there are 
                                                
6 The variance inflation factor (VIF) of the independent variables used in the regression of this study is less than 2.5, which is less than 10, indicating 
that the problem of multicollinearity is not significant. 
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differences among analysis periods. The analysis period of 2005-2014 is the most significant7. This means that the 
accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is higher in the case of the firms that make voluntary disclosure than in the 
case of other firms. These results support Hypothesis 1a and are consistent with previous studies that voluntary 
disclosure mitigates information asymmetry between firms and investors, which improves the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts.  
 
For control variables, the quality of earnings (EQ), the number of analysts (FOLLOWS), return on equity (ROE), 
and firm sizes (SIZE) show a significant positive (+) relationship with the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
(AFACC), while financial leverage (LEV) show a significant negative (-) relationship with the accuracy of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts (AFACC). 
 
 
Table 4. The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on the Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 𝐴𝐹𝐴𝐶𝐶$% = 	𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀$% + 𝛽0𝐸𝑄$% + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆$% + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽:𝑅𝑂𝐸$% + 𝛽<𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽?𝐴𝐺𝐸$% +𝛽A𝐺𝑅𝑊$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀%													 (1) 
Variable 2004 – 2014 (N=1,998) 2005 – 2014 (N=1,819) 2007 – 2014 (N=1,388) Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept - 0.184*** - 3.34 - 0.239*** - 3.07 - .217*** - 3.22 
VDUM 0.013* 1.79 0.021*** 2.76 0.020* 1.87 
EQ 0.147** 2.53 0.142** 2.37 0.180** 2.3 
FOLLOWS 0.002*** 3.16 0.002*** 3.16 0.002*** 2.65 
LEV - 0.192*** - 9.5 - 0.188*** - 8.94 - 0.204*** - 7.83 
ROE 0.001*** 9.29 0.001*** 8.73 0.001*** 6.77 
SIZE 0.010*** 3.53 0.010*** 3.18 0.009** 2.46 
AGE - 0.001* - 1.91 - 0.001 - 1.57 - 0.001 - 1.32 
GRW 0.002 0.66 0.001 0.59 0.001 0.37 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
F-value 12.54*** 13.71*** 10.09*** 
Adj. R2 14.49% 14.29% 13.46% 
 
 
4.2.2 Analysis of Voluntary Disclosure and the Analysts’ Bias in Earnings Forecast 
 
Table 5 shows the results of regression analysis of Equation (1) for the effects of voluntary disclosure on analysts’ 
bias in earnings forecasts. The F value in the analysis results is statistically significant, which indicates that the 
research model is appropriate. In Table 5, the regression coefficient (β1) of VDUM that shows the effect of voluntary 
disclosure on analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts have significant negative values, although there are differences 
among analysis periods. The analysis period of 2005-2014 is the most significant This means that analysts 
underestimate earnings per share, that is, actual earnings per share are larger than analysts’ earnings per share forecasts 
in the case of the firms that make voluntary disclosure in the case of other firms. These results indicate that analysts 
underestimate earnings per share in the case of those firms that make voluntary disclosure, which supports Hypothesis 
1b. 
For control variables, the quality of earnings (EQ), number of analysts (FOLLOWS), return on equity (ROE), and 
firm sizes (SIZE) shows significant negative (-) relationship with analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts (AFBIAS), while 
financial leverage (LEV) shows significant positive (+) relationship with analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts 
(AFBIAS). 
  
                                                
7 We follow the base year and definition of voluntary disclosure as defined by Kim et al. (2016). In previous studies, three base years are defined 
based on the customs of notifying the time of application of changes in disclosure environments and considering the time for firms to recognize the 
abolition of the provision for mandatory disclosure. The first base year is 2004 when the Financial Services Commission decided to apply the 
amended financial reporting standards, and the second base year is 2005 when the Korea Accounting Standards Board decided to apply the full text 
of the amended enterprise accounting standards. Finally, since firms may continue disclosure without recognizing the abolition of the existing 
provision for mandatory disclosure, 2007 is set as the third base year considering the period necessary for firms to recognize the change in the 
provision (Kim et al., 2016). Therefore, this study presents all of the empirical results with the analysis period of 2004-2014, 2005-2014, and 2007-
2014 according to the above three base years. 
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Table 5. The Effects of Voluntary Disclosure on the Analysts’ Bias in Earnings Forecast 	𝐴𝐹𝐵𝐼𝐴𝑆$% = 	𝛽) + 𝛽+𝑉𝐷𝑈𝑀$% + 𝛽0𝐸𝑄$% + 𝛽3𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑂𝑊𝑆$% + 𝛼9𝐿𝐸𝑉$% + 𝛽:𝑅𝑂𝐸$% + 𝛽<𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸$% + 𝛽?𝐴𝐺𝐸$% + 𝛽A𝐺𝑅𝑊$% + 𝑌𝐷 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 + 𝜀%																		 (2) 
Variable 2004 – 2014 (N=1,998) 2005 – 2014 (N=1,819) 2007 – 2014 (N=1,388) Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.278*** 3.55 0.243*** 2.97 0.208*** 3.04 
VDUM - 0.016** - 2.01 - 0.018** - 2.23 - 0.019* - 1.76 
EQ - 0.113* - 1.86 - 0.094 - 1.5 - 0.150* - 1.84 
FOLLOWS - 0.002** - 2.38 - 0.002** - 2.48 - 0.002** - 2.26 
LEV 0.190*** 8.97 0.189*** 8.56 0.205*** 7.57 
ROE - 0.002*** - 10.98 - 0.001*** - 9.63 - 0.001*** - 7.3 
SIZE - 0.011*** - 3.68 - 0.010*** - 3.12 - 0.009** - 2.32 
AGE 0.001 0.67 0.001 0.46 0.001 0.18 
GRW - 0.001 - 0.38 - 0.001 - 0.59 - 0.001 - 0.37 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
F-value 14.62*** 12.58*** 9.53*** 
Adj. R2 13.95% 13.18% 12.73% 
 
 
4.3 Additional Analysis 
 
4.3.1 Analysis According to Determinants of Disclosure  
 
Kim et al. (2016) select firm age, debt ratios, returns on equity, and industrial concentration as determinants for 
voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost and report empirical results. Thus, we further analyze how 
the analysts’ earnings forecast differ according to debt ratio and firm age among the determinants of voluntary disclose 
(debt ratios, firm age). Table 6 and Table 7 show the results of regression analysis, which is divided into the above 
group and the below group based on the median of the debt ratios (LEV) and firm age (AGE), respectively. 
 
Previous studies regarding debt ratios (LEV) report that firms tend to voluntarily provide information on firms’ 
business as a part of the effort to prevent the termination of debt contracts or deterioration of liquidity (Francis et al., 
2005; Kim et al., 2016). In Table 6, the results yield a statistical significance in the above group with higher debt 
ratios. The group with higher debt ratios show a higher accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and underestimation. This 
suggests that the higher debt ratios, the greater incentives to reduce information asymmetry through voluntary 
disclosure.  
 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – May/June 2017 Volume 33, Number 3 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 632 The Clute Institute 
Table 6. Analysis of the debt ratios (LEV) among Determinant of Disclosure 
Panel A: The Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
Variable LEV > Median LEV > Median Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept - 0.202 - 1.35 - 0.239*** - 3.24 
VDUM 0.031*** 2.92 - 0.003 - 0.4 
EQ 0.146 1.23 0.080 1.51 
FOLLOWS 0.003*** 3.03 0.001 1.6 
LEV - 0.521*** - 6.05 - 0.107*** - 4.56 
ROE 0.002*** 8.35 0.001*** 2.79 
SIZE 0.017*** 2.96 0.009*** 3.14 
AGE - 0.001 - 1.53 - 0.001* - 1.9 
GRW 0.005 1.16 - 0.001 - 0.52 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included 
F-value 21.54*** 4.8*** 
Adj. R2 9.96% 6.89% 
 
Panel B: The Analysts’ Bias in Earnings Forecast 
Variable LEV > Median LEV > Median Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.248 1.57 0.245*** 3.21 
VDUM - 0.035** - 2.27 0.001 0.13 
EQ - 0.173 - 1.38 0.008 0.15 
FOLLOWS - 0.002 - 1.21 - 0.001 - 1.41 
LEV 0.557*** 6.12 0.075*** 3.09 
ROE - 0.003*** - 8.54 - 0.001*** - 5.52 
SIZE - 0.021*** - 3.39 - 0.008*** - 2.86 
AGE 0.001 1.27 0.000 - 0.48 
GRW - 0.005 - 1.08 0.003 1.09 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included 
F-value 9.69*** 4.04*** 
Adj. R2 21.03% 5.58% 
Note: This table presents the analysis of the debt ratios (LEV) among determinant of disclosure. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
Previous studies regarding firm age (AGE) report that the longer firm age, the better information environment and the 
more likely the analysts are interested (Blinski, 2014; Shin and Oh, 2014). In Table 7, the results yield a statistical 
significance in the above group with longer firm age. Older firms exhibit a higher accuracy of analysts’ forecasts and 
underestimation. This is consistent with the results of previous studies that the longer firm age, the better information 
environment of the market. In the case of the below group with shorter firm age, voluntary disclosure shows positive 
(+) relationship with the accuracy of earnings forecasts and underestimation, although not statistically significant. 
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Table 7. Analysis of the firm age (AGE) among Determinant of Disclosure 
Panel A: The Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast 
Variable LEV > Median LEV > Median Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept - 0.303*** - 2.78 - 0.159*** - 1.69 
VDUM 0.022*** 2.89 0.010 1.02 
EQ 0.119 1.21 0.130* 1.92 
FOLLOWS 0.002*** 2.70 0.002*** 2.68 
LEV - 0.249*** - 7.62 - 0.145*** - 5.75 
ROE 0.002*** 7.53 0.001*** 5.91 
SIZE 0.014*** 3.01 0.006 1.55 
AGE 0.001 1.18 0.001* 1.91 
GRW 0.012* 1.70 0.001 0.31 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included 
F-value 9.35*** 7.14*** 
Adj. R2 16.96% 12.46% 
 
Panel B: The Analysts’ Bias in Earnings Forecast 
Variable LEV > Median LEV > Median Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 0.305*** 2.77 0.166* 1.65 
VDUM - 0.023** - 2.27 - 0.016 - 1.55 
EQ - 0.069 - 0.69 - 0.072 - 1.10 
FOLLOWS - 0.002* - 1.87 - 0.002*** - 2.81 
LEV 0.260*** 7.77 0.134*** 4.95 
ROE - 0.002*** - 9.74 - 0.001*** - 6.04 
SIZE - 0.014*** - 2.88 - 0.006 - 1.41 
AGE - 0.001* - 1.95 - 0.001 - 1.59 
GRW - 0.010 - 1.33 - 0.003 - 0.35 
Year and Industry Dummy Included Included 
F-value 10.81*** 5.93*** 
Adj. R2 19.36% 10.26% 
Note: This table presents the analysis of the firm age (AGE) among determinant of disclosure. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels respectively, based on two-tailed test. See the Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, the effects of voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost on analysts’ earnings forecasts 
are analyzed using 1,998 firm-year observations in the period of 2004-2014. Voluntary disclosure plays a positive role 
of enhancing the efficiency of the capital market by reducing the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors through transmission of more pieces of information, but it may lower the reliability of financial information 
due to increased arbitrariness of managers (Sohn et al., 2008). We note the difficulties in the accurate measurement of 
disclosure as a major cause of the mixed results of empirical analyses. We set up and analyze the disclosure of the 
schedule of manufacturing cost as a proxy for voluntary disclosure. 
 
The results of our study are as follows. First, the relationship between voluntary disclosure of the schedule of 
manufacturing cost and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is significant in the positive (+) direction. This 
means that the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts is higher in the case of the firms that voluntarily disclosed the 
schedule of manufacturing cost, as compared to other firms. Second, the relationship between voluntary disclosure of 
the schedule of manufacturing cost and analysts’ bias in earnings forecasts is significant in the negative (-) direction. 
This means that analysts underestimate earnings in the case of the firms that voluntarily disclose the schedule of 
manufacturing cost, as compared to other firms.  
 
Since the schedule of manufacturing cost is still an interesting item and useful information in the capital market, the 
results of our study provide important implications not only to managers, but also to investors and supervisory 
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authority. Limitations of our study include the fact that not all diverse variables that affect voluntary disclosure and 
analysts’ forecasts are considered. In addition, since we analyze the relationship between voluntary disclosure of the 
schedule of manufacturing cost and analysts’ earnings forecasts, there may be a bias in sampling, as the firms with no 
information on analysts’ earnings forecasts may have been fundamentally excluded from our analyses. Finally, we 
look forward to a study on the effects of voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost on capital markets 
and firms in accounting research. 
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APPENDIX: Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variables 
AFACCit = 
| AFit - AEit | / Pit, where AFit is analysts’ forecast for firm i for the fiscal year t and AEit is the actual realized 
earnings per share for firm i in year t and Pit is market value per share for firm i in year t; 
AFBIASit = 
(AFit - AEit) / Pit, where AFit is analysts’ forecast for firm i for the fiscal year t and AEit is the actual realized 
earnings per share for firm i in year t; 
 
Explanatory Variables 
VDUM = 
an indicator variable that indicates firms of the voluntary disclosure of the schedule of manufacturing cost, 
1 if the firm that five manufacturing cost items (raw materials, labor costs, manufacturing overheads, total 
manufacturing cost for the year, costs of goods manufactured during the year) are disclosed, and 0 otherwise; 
 
Control variables 
EQ = the absolute residual of the Dechow et al. (1995) discretionary accrual model, multiplied by -1; 
FOLLOWS = the number of analysts who report earnings forecasts for the firm; 
LEV = financial leverage, measured as long-term liabilities divided by lagged total assets; 
ROE = return on equity, measured as net income divided by lagged total equity; 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
AGE = the number of years from the date of initial listing to the lagged period; 
GRW = asset growth, measured as the natural log of total assets in year t divided by total assets in t-1; 
YD = year dummy; 
IND = industry dummy. 
 
